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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - FREEDOM OF RELIGION -
USE OF DRUGS
Leary v. United States, 383 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1967),
cert. granted, 392 U.S. 903 (1968).
In 1966, Dr. Timothy Leary, the psychedelic psychologist and
prophet,1 was convicted of illegal concealment and transportation
of marihuana by a United States district court.2  Of the three timely
constitutional questions presented by the case, the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit faintly answered one, summarily dismissed
the second, and altogether ignored the third in affirming the con-
viction.3 This recent case, Leary v. United States,4 is another
example of a disturbing trend in American jurisprudence, for again
1 Leary holds a Ph.D. in clinical psychology and until recently was a member of
the faculty at Harvard University. He has written and published seven books and 51
articles pertaining to the religious, scientific, and medical use of psychedelic drugs.
Leary v. United States, 383 F.2d 851, 856-57 (5th Cir. 1967). His avowed purpose,
as the founder of the League for Spiritual Discovery, is "to change and elevate the
consciousness of the American within the next few years." NEW YORKEi, Oct. 1, 1966,
at 43.
2 383 F.2d at 854. Leary was found guilty of violating both 21 U.S.C. § 176(a) and
26 U.S.C. § 474 4(a)(2). The former prohibits transportation, facilitation of trans-
portation, and concealment of marihuana after importation. The latter prohibits
transportation and concealment of marihuana without first making payment of the
transfer tax.
Leary received the maximum penalty for each offense - a total of 30 years impris-
onment and $40,000 in fines. The maximum sentence was imposed subject to the
provisions of 18 U.S.C. §4208(b), which provides for a complete study of a defendant
when a court desires detailed information for determining the sentence to be imposed.
However, Leary's final conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 17 (a) would require a mandatory
sentence of five years, and under 26 U.S.C. § 7237 there can be no suspension of
sentence or probation for such conviction.
3 Leary's counsel effectively raised the constitutional questions in his points of
error. The first point raised both of the first amendment issues, the "free exercise"
question and the "establishment dause" question:
In light of the federal exemption from restrictive legislation granted to
religious users of peyote and the Government's inability to establish that
marihuana is more harmful than peyote, the denial of a religious exemption
from the marihauna legislation is an invidious religious discrimination in
violation of the First and Fifth Amendments. 383 F.2d at 858.
The self-incrimination issue was also succinctly stated by Leary's counsel:
The statutory requirement of a written order form (26 U.S.C. § 4742) and
the imposition of a transfer tax (26 U.S.C. § 4741(a), violate appellant's
constitutional privilege against compulsory self-incrimination and render
invalid the conviction .... 383 F.2d at 858-59.
4 383 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. granted, 392 U.S. 903 (1968).
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a court failed to thoroughly examine and analyze traditional legal
rules in the context of changed or changing societal norms.5
The first contention in Leary's defense was that the federal
marihuana control statutes deprived him of the constitutional right
to the free exercise of religion. At the trial, Leary had admitted
his use of marihuana, but he had professed such usage to be exclu-
sively as a sacramental aid in his religion.6 In rejecting this argu-
ment the appellate court correctly observed that religious freedom
under the first amendment "embraces two concepts - freedom to
believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature
of things, the second cannot be."'
Traditionally, the freedom to overtly exercise one's religion has
been deemed conditional and relative. A long line of United States
Supreme Court decisions has evidenced that a legislature may con-
stitutionally place certain limits on the free exercise of religious be-
liefs if such limits are deemed necessary to protect society, or if they
are in the interest of public health or morals.8 Thus, in the present
case the court was well supported by precedent when it interpreted
the federal statutes as indicating that Congress has manifested grave
concern over the use of marihuana and has seen fit to proscribe it
via severe criminal penalties because it poses a substantial threat to
our country's safety, peace, and order. While the court found
adequate support for its conclusions in the traditional constitutional
5 Indeed, a further thorough analysis should be forthcoming from the Supreme
Court on the self-incrimination issue. Certiorari was granted by the Court on June
10, 1968, limited to the following questions:
I. Whether the registration and tax provisions in 26 U.S.C. Sections
4741 (a), 4742 and 4744 (a), as applied to Petitioner, violate his privi-
lege against self-incrimination protected by the Fifth Amendment . . .as
amplified by this Court in three recently decided cases: Marchetti v.
United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968); Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S.
62 (1968); Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85 (1968)....
IV. Whether petitioner was denied due process under the Fifth Amendment
by the application, under the circumstances of this case, of the provisions
of 21 U.S.C. § 17 6 (a), providing that an inference may be drawn respecting
the illegal origin and nature of marihuana solely from possession thereof.
Leary v. United States, cert. granted, 392 U.S. 903 (1968).
6 It was established at trial that Leary was a convert to Hinduism and a member
of the Brahmakrishma sect in Massachusetts. In India this sect uses marihuana for
religious illumination and meditation. 383 F.2d at 857.
7 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940), cited in 383 F.2d at 859.
8 See, e.g., Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (Pennsylvania Sunday-closing
statute upheld over Sabbatarians' free exercise arguments); Reynolds v. United States,
98 U.S. 145 (1878) (Mormons denied exemption from antibigamy laws); Application
of President and Director of Georgetown Hospital, 331 F.2d 1000, rehearing denied,
331 F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1965) (imposition of
blood transfusion over religious objection).
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rhetoric employed in the freedom of religion cases, its black and
white approach side-steps analysis of deep-rooted constitutional and
societal ambiguities existing in the law today.
Dr. Leary placed great emphasis on two recent free exercise
cases which have specifically enunciated and refined the balancing
test that is implied in the traditional constitutional jargon.9 In
Sherbert v. Verner,'° the Court held that South Carolina's disqual-
ification of a Seventh Day Adventist from unemployment compen-
sation benefits solely because she would not accept Saturday employ-
ment imposed an unconstitutional burden on the free exercise of
religion. The Court further demanded a showing of a compelling
state interest to justify the substantial infringement of an individ-
ual's right to religious freedom. 1 And in People v. Woody, 2 a
case similar to Leary, the Supreme Court of California reversed the
convictions of a group of Navajo Indians arrested for illegal use
of peyote, indicating that in the absence of a showing of a com-
pelling state interest, the state may not prohibit the use of peyote
for bonafide religious practices because the application of such a
statute unconstitutionally infringes upon the first amendment right
to the free exercise of religion. Mindful of the mandate in Sher-
bert, and of the traditionally preferred status of first amendment
rights which tends to negate the presumption of constitutionality
generally accorded legislation, the California court found that the
individual's right outweighed the state's interest in abridging it. It
concluded that the use of peyote presented only a slight danger to
the state and to the enforcement of its laws and, on the other hand,
found a greater and redeeming social value in preserving the reli-
gious heritage of the Native American Church.3
In spite of the rationale of these cases, and in the face of the
recent Supreme Court trend toward a more critical judicial examina-
9 The competing interests in this balance are the individual's right, guaranteed
by the Constitution, to freely exercise his religion, versus the state's interest in securing
peace, safety, and the general welfare of its citizens.
20 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
11 Id. at 406.
12 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964). See also companion
case In re Grady, 61 Cal. 2d 887, 394 P.2d 728, 39 Cal. Rptr. 912 (1964), decided
the same day as Woody. In Grady the court reversed the conviction of the petitioner
who was the self-styled spiritual leader of a small group using peyote for religious
purposes. But see State v. Bullard, 267 N.C. 599, 148 S.E.2d 565 (1966), cert.
denied, 386 U.S. 917 (1967), where the court unanimously affirmed the conviction
of a young college-age man who claimed to be a Peyotist with Buddhist leanings
and a recent convert to the Neo-American Church.
13 61 Cal. 2d at 727, 394 P.2d at 77,40 Cal. Rptr. at 821.
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tion of the use of the police power when first amendment religious
freedoms are at stake,14 the Leary court did not find itself compelled
to critically examine the conflicting interests which posed the con-
stitutional issue. Instead, the court emphasized the weight accorded
congressional legislation, and thereby "ducked" consideration of a
true "balancing of interests" approach.
The court discounted Leary's argument based on Sherbert that
the burden was on the government to show a compelling interest
to justify abridgement of first amendment rights by concluding that
Sherbert is inapplicable because it concerned a social welfare statute
and not one that imposed criminal sanctions.15 Although the diver-
gent ends of these statutes represent a valid distinction, the implica-
tion that a criminal statute requires less constitutional consideration
than its humanitarian counterpart cannot be sustained, especially
when both are shown to equally curtail the free exercise of reli-
gion.'6 Nevertheless, the court's constitutional inquiry amounted
merely to a short review of the legislative history of the Marihuana
Tax Act of 1937.17 From this review it was concluded that Con-
gress wisely passed the act and thus it clearly met the "compelling
State interest" test imposed by Sherbert.' With this circumlocu-
tion, the court implied that the government, in 1968, does not have
to show a present compelling federal interest to justify abridgement
of first amendment rights because in 1937 the Act was wisely
adopted, and thus, it meets the present constitutional standard. 9
14 This trend has resulted in the use of an exemption technique which grants
immunity from statutes for bona fide religious practices. See Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398 (1963); In re Jenison, 125 N.W.2d 588 (Minn.), on remand from,
375 U.S. 14 (1963) (mem.). See generally 17 STAN. L. REV. 494-95 (1965).
15 383 F.2d at 860.
16 But see Note, Hallucinogens, 68 COLum. L. REV. 521, 550 (1968), where it is
submitted that the distinction between Woody and Leary is the doctrine that religious
practice can be no defense to prosecution under a valid criminal statute prohibiting
conduct rather than belief. Thus, it is concluded that wherever the state makes a
colorable claim that its regulation protects the health or safety of its citizens, a defense
to that regulation based on the free exercise clause will fail. Id. at 551. This may
be a realistic appraisal of what in fact usually occurs, e.g., the Leary case; but the point
is, should sacred individual rights traditionally safeguarded by the first amendment
give way to colorable state claims?
17 50 Stat. 551 (1937), as amended, INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 §§ 4741-76, 26
U.S.C. §§ 4741-76 (1954). The court presented this view in 383 F.2d at 869.
18 383 F.2d at 869. It is interesting to note that many have charged that the 1937
Act was scare-enacted and was the result of a long and zealous publicity campaign
spearheaded by the Federal Bureau of Narcotics and especially by its chief, Harry J.
Auslinger. See A. INDEsMITH, THE ADDIcT AN THE LAW 228 (1965); Foreword:
Marihuana Myths, in THE MARIJUANA PAPERS at XV (D. Solomon ed. 1966).
19 Such an approach overlooks the fact that the use of marihuana for religious
experience was not prevalent in the United States at that time, and probably was not
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Such an approach to judicial review limits the extension of personal
rights in a culturally changing society.
Although the Leary court's fixation on congressional intention
foreclosed any meaningful consideration of the conflicting interests
that should be weighed in free exercise cases, the court did tacitly
beg such a consideration when it concluded:
It would be difficult to imagine the harm which would result if
the criminal statutes against marihuana were nullified as to those
who claim the right to possess and traffic in this drug for religious
purposes. For all practical purposes, the anti-marihuana laws
would be meaningless, and enforcement impossible. The danger
is too great, especially to the youth of the nation, at a time when
psychedelic experience, 'turn on,' is the 'in' thing to so many, for
this court to yield to the argument that the use of marihuana for
so-called religious purposes should be permitted under the Free
Exercise Clause. We will not, therefore, subscribe to the danger-
ous doctrine that the free exercise of religion accords an unlimited
freedom to violate the laws of the land relative to marihuana. 20
There is evidence to support the above assertion," which sug-
gests a compelling state interest in the control of marihuana, and
it is unfortunate that the court did not specifically analyze the
dangers and enumerate the enforcement problems that compose such
interest. Clearly, it is within the police power for the legislature
to regulate activities which pose a substantial threat to the public
safety, peace, or order.22  Yet, fortunately, in recent years several
progressive courts have refused to accept such vague generalities as
"unimaginable harm" and "difficulty of enforcement" as ipso facto
rationales for the imposition of police power regulations that
abridge the free exercise of religion.2
When constitutional immunity is sought for religious use of
marihuana, there are realistic considerations which should serve as
inputs in applying the balancing process, and upon which a court
can make an analytical determination. First, the court must consider
the sincerity and conviction of the individual in his belief.2 If
even considered when the act was passed. It also overlooks the fact that by 1955 even
Mr. Auslinger had toned down his previous views enunciated in 1937, espedally in
regard to marihuana's propensity to lead to violent crime. See A. LINDESMRTH, supra
note 18, at 230-31.
20 383 P.2d at 861.
21See notes 26 and 31 infra & accompanying text.
2 2 See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
2aSee People v. Woody, 61 Cal.2d 716, 724, 394 P.2d 813, 819, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69,
75 (1964). See also cases cited note 14 supra.
2 4 However, as it has been repeatedly held, the first amendment prohibits judicial
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convinced of the individual's good faith the court must, in light of
legislative inaction, consider the realistic and actual threat the sub-
stance poses for the individual and for society as a whole. Certainly,
recent discontent with the established church in today's society, the
markedly increased examination of "turning on" and "dropping
out," and the ever increasing use of "psychedelic" drugs for abusive
as well as legitimate religious and scientific purposes,25 indicate that
the law can no longer afford to delay making these determinations.
Actually the only risk to the individual from the use of mari-
huana, that has been scientifically verified, is the fact that continued
use can produce a psychological dependency.26 Thus one possible
substantial danger which the religious use of marihuana might
pose to society is its use as an escape from reality. However, such
a threat is equally as great with a number of other legal substances,
such as alcohol and barbituates.27 It would appear that 30 years
after the passage of the Marihuana Tax Act the effects of the drug
are no longer "unimaginable," since the physical and physiological
inquiry into the believability of an individual's creed. See, e.g., United States v.
Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1943), where the Court said:
Men may believe what they cannot prove. They may not be put to the proof
of their religious doctrines or beliefs. Religious experiences which are as
real as life to some may be incomprehensible to others. Id. at 86-87.
See generally Note, Constitutional Law: (Fredom of Religion) + (LSD) = (Psy-
chedelic Dilemma), 41 TEMP. L.Q. 52, 54-55 (1967) (helpful discussion of the impor-
tance of "good faith").
2 5 See Blum, Mind Altering Drugs and Dangerous Behavior, Dangerous Drugs,
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
TASK FORCE REPORT: NARCOTICS AND DRUG ABUSE 24 (1967), indicating a vast
increase in the use of marihuana among middle-class students.
26 This is especially so if the user has preexisting psychotic tendencies. See
McGlothlin, Cannabis: A Reference, in THE MARIJUANA PAPERS 410-12 (D. Solomon
ed. 1966). All of the other supposed evils that the use of marihuana poses for society
have not been empirically demonstrated. The charges that marihuana smoking leads
to violent and aggressive acts and thus causes major crimes has never been substantiated.
See id. at 412. The myth that the use of marihuana will eventually lead to heroin
or opium addiction has never been proved. See A. LINDESMITH, supra note 18, at
230-31, where it is reported that even Mr. Auslinger, former head of the Bureau of
Narcotics, went on record in 1937 stating that the marihuana user does not usually
graduate to heroin, opium or cocaine. The fear that marihuana use causes insanity
has been widely dispelled as unfounded. See Allentuck & Bowman, Psychiatric Aspects
of Marihuana Intoxication, in THE MARIJUANA PAPERS 361 (D. Solomon ed. 1966).
And the accusation that marihuana is widely used for erotic pleasure and sexual
exploitation has never been demonstrated. See The LaGuardia Study, in id. at 250.
Moreover, there is general medical and scientific agreement that marihuana is not a
narcotic, does not produce a tolerance or cause any of the withdrawal symptoms of
the opiates, and as such is nonaddictive. See Note, supra note 24, at 62 & n.50.
27See A. IJNDESMITH, supra note 18, at 234, concluding that: "All empirical
investigations indicate that alcohol constitutes a far greater social danger than does
marihuana."
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effects are at least as empirically measurable as the effects of alco-
hol.28
Thus, the significant question - the extent to which it has
been answered by implication in cases such as Leary can only be
conjectured - would appear to be, should the courts grant con-
stitutional immunity for the free exercise of psychedelic religion?
Decisions of the Supreme Court seem to indicate that one who
professes a psychedelic religion can only be questioned as to his
sincerity and good faith, not to the believability of his creed. 9
Furthermore, recent cases imply that the concept of religious belief
is broad enough to accommodate psychedelic cults under the first
amendment protection."0 From this it can be concluded that pre-
cedent does not stand as an inflexible bar to an affirmative response
to the above mentioned query. However, it is conceivable that the
effects of marihuana and other psychedelic substances, that have
given rise to their use as a religious aid, are the same effects that
stand in the way of constitutional protection. The propensities of
these drugs to alter the ego structure and cause a change in per-
ception, usually reaching a zenith at the "intoxication level" when
sensory hallucinations occur, have given rise to their use for reli-
gious experience."- Although many have asserted that religious
experience outside of reality cannot be meaningful within the nor-
mal environment, and others have criticized psychedelic experience
as a theological shortcut,8 2 no one has ventured to cast the first
stone and deny its spiritual value per se.
When these considerations are viewed in light of this country's
fundamental commitment to protect the free exercise of religion,
the Leary court's approach in not realistically evaluating or even
considering the possibility of a constitutional exemption for sacra-
mental use of marihuana seems shortsighted. 8 In a new era, with
28 McGlothlin, supra note 26, at 412-15. McGlothlin suggests that one of the
reasons why cannabis is so regularly banned in countries where alcohol is permitted
is the positive value placed on action, and the hostility toward passivity found in
Anglo-Saxon cultures.
29 Cf. note 24 & accompanying text.
SOUnited States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965). The Court held that a belief
which occupies a place in the life of its possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox
belief in God could qualify for conscientious objector exemption from the Universal
Military Training and Service Act, 50 U.S.C. 5§ 451-71 (App. 1964).3 1 See Note, supra note 16, at 533-34; Note, supra note 24, at 74. But it is in this
"high" condition that the state has a valid concern. As in the case of the drunk, this
condition can produce automobile accidents or other irresponsible acts. Cf. Bieser,
Drugs and the Law or Who Pays for the 'TWrip" 36 U. Cni. L. REV. 39 (1967).
32 Note, supra note 24, at 73 & on. 95-98.
3 The law has demonstrated that it is capable of proscribing certain conduct
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new religions and cults challenging the basis of the Judeo-Christian
heritage, the first amendment must be interpreted with tolerance if
it is to have meaning at all. The words of Mr. Justice Jackson in
W/est Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette3" are particularly
relevant today:
We can have intellectual individualism and the rich cultural di-
versities that we owe to exceptional minds only at the price of
occasional eccentricity and abnormal attitudes.... But, freedom to
differ is not limited to things that do not matter much .... The
test of its substance is the right to differ as to things that touch
the heart of the existing order.35
In light of the Leary court's conservative and skeptical approach to
the constitutional dilemma posed by the sacramental use of mari-
huana, the viability of Mr. Justice Jackson's ideal may be in jeopardy.
The second interesting constitutional question in the Leary case,
raised by defendant's invocation of the fifth amendment privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination, has been given much support
by three recent Supreme Court decisions. 6 The appellate court
summarily dismissed Leary's contention that those sections of the
United States Code which impose a tax on all transfers of marihuana
and which require that transfers be accompanied by written order
forms issued by the Secretary of the Treasury are unconstitutional
when tested against that mandate of the Bill of Rights.3 7 However,
subsequent to the rejection of Leary's argument, the Supreme Court
has held that an individual who properly raises the fifth amendment
privilege cannot be criminally punished for failure to comply with
the federal wagering tax stamp statutes."8 While the Court spe-
while allowing exceptions for legitimate and regulated aspects of the proscribed activity.
Gambling is one such excellent example. During prohibition, when the harmful
effects of alcohol were "hardly imaginable" and when that substance was considered
injurious to the public health and morals, religious exemptions for sacramental usage
were liberally granted. National Prohibition Act, ch. 85, 41 Star. 305, 308 (1919).
34 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
351d. at 641-42.
36 See cases cited in note 5 supra.
37 383 F.2d at 870. See note 5 supra.
3 8 Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 61 (1968). The reasons the Court
enumerates for this holding all appear equally applicable to the marihuana registration
tax problem. The Court first pointed out that wagering is "an area permeated with
criminal statutes," and those engaged in wagering are a group "inherently suspect of
criminal activities." Id. at 47. Also, it realistically acknowledged that information
obtained as a consequence of the federal wagering tax laws is readily available to
assist state and federal authorities in prosecutions for gambling. Thus, the Court
concluded that the obligations to register and pay the gambling tax created "real and
appreciable" and not merely "imaginary and unsubstantial" hazards of self-incrimina-
tion. Id. at 48.
USE OF DRUGS
cifically narrowed the holding to the wagering tax stamp situation,
its emphasis on "an area permeated with criminal statutes"3 9 and
"substantial hazards of incrimination," 40 should open the door into
the highly analogous area of marihuana registration and transfer
taxes for a similar invocation of the fifth amendment privilege.-"
The third constitutional issue, which was completely ignored by
the Leary court, regards the first amendment prohibition of any law
respecting the establishment of religion. Leary argued that federal
exemption from restrictive legislation granted to religious users of
peyote42 would constitute invidious religious discrimination if like
exemptions were not granted to him 3 Although this "tit for tat"
argument is not entirely sound, it does raise blatant "establish-
ment clause" problems not dealt with in the opinion. This clause,
as interpreted recently by the Supreme Court, imposes on all organs
of government an obligation of strict neutrality toward religious
issues,44 and requires that legislation, in order to be constitutional,
must have a secular purpose and a primary effect that neither
advances nor inhibits religion. 5 Federal exemption of some drugs
for sacramental purposes would seem prima facie to conflict with
the strict constitutional standard. Again, it would appear that the
Leary court, by failing to realistically evaluate the issues, comfort-
ably evades the pressing constitutional and societal "hang-ups" pre-
sented to it.
In holding as they did, the Court also dearly distinguished the "public records"
doctrine of Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1947), and found it inapplicable
because: (1) Marchetti was not required by administrative order to keep and preserve
records; (2) information desired by the government was not public information in the
traditional usage of the term; and (3) Shapiro requirements were imposed in "an
essentially non-criminal and regulatory area of inquiry" not directed to a "selective
group inherently suspect of criminal activity." Id. at 57. Also definitely applicable
to both gambling and marihuana registration taxes is the Communist Party registra-
tion case, Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 382 U.S. 70 (1965), which
has been read as providing fifth amendment immunity for prosecutions based on
interrelated statutory schemes, an obvious purpose of which is to coerce evidence from
persons engaged in illegal activities for use in their prosecution. See concurring
opinion of Mr. Justice Brennan, id. at 73.
39 Id. at 47.
40 Id. at 61.
41 See Note, supra note 16, at 548, for the same prediction.
42 The Federal Commissioner of Food and Drugs has exempted peyote from use in
bona fide religious ceremonies of the Native American Church, 21 C.F.R. § 166.3(c).
383 F.2d at 861. Also the States of New Mexico, Montana, Arizona, and California
have like exemptions. People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d at 723-24, 394 P.2d at 819, 40
Cal. Rptr. at 75.
43 383 F.2d at 858.
44 Abington School Dist. v. Shempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225-26 (1963).
45 Id. at 222.
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